Sociology for the Glasnost Era: Institutional and Substantive Changes in Recent Soviet Sociology*

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Abstract

Gorbachev's ascent to power created a new climate for sociological research in the Soviet Union. For the first time, Soviet sociologists find themselves in a position where they not only can pursue critical inquiry but also significantly affect the nation's political agenda. The present situation is not without its dangers, however, as it confronts social scientists with the need to balance scholarship and advocacy, scientific inquiry and political engagement. This article presents an overview of institutional, substantive, and methodological innovations in recent Soviet sociology. It examines the contribution that Soviet sociology has made to the reform process and assesses its future impact on the course of perestroika. An argument is made that even though for the time being Soviet sociologists and Party reformers act in concert, this alliance might come under strain if the pursuit of free inquiry interferes with the Communist Party's political agenda.

Soviet sociology has had many ups and downs throughout its troubled history, its fortunes rising and falling with every new attempt to open up Soviet society. It sprang to life in the 1920s, during the NEP (New Economic Policy) era, which saw the pioneering efforts of Gastev, Kabo, Strumilin, and others bear impressive results in areas as diverse as labor-management relations, rural sociology, marriage and the family, prostitution, and suicide. These early successes proved short-lived. With the NEP liberalism waning, empirically oriented sociology in the Soviet Union came under attack from orthodox Marxists. In the 1930s, the fledgling discipline faded away, and so did the term "sociology," which reappeared only after World War II as a name for the "bourgeois pseudo-science of society" incompatible with the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin (Masalkov 1988; Osipov 1988; Zaslavskiaia 1988a).

The next wave of reforms ushered in by Khrushchev brought a revival of sociological research in the Soviet Union. In 1958, the Soviet Sociological Association (SSA) was formed. The next ten years produced a steady growth in empirical studies

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carried out by the enthusiastic, even if unskilled, practitioners who left philosophy, economics, history, psychology, and other established fields for what appeared to be an exciting new venture well equipped to challenge the orthodoxy. The “new sociology,” as the post-Stalinist social science was called by Western observers (Labedz 1956; Kassof 1961; Fischer 1964; Simirenko 1966), failed to live up to its promise. The term “sociology” was never fully rehabilitated. The lengthy debate about the new field confirmed it as an empirical arm of historical materialism, deemed to be the general sociological theory, while the catchword “concrete social research,” reserved for the sociological enterprise proper, highlighted its subordinate status in the hierarchy of academic sciences. With Khrushchev’s reforms coming to a screeching halt, Soviet sociology once again fell on hard times. A series of noisy campaigns in the late 1960s and 1970s forced many sociologists to leave the Institute of Sociological Research in the USSR Academy of Science, the nation’s preeminent sociological center. The highly regarded Leningrad School of sociology was decimated, its leading proponents scrambling to find refuge in neighboring disciplines. Entire areas of sociological research were effectively closed, others narrowed in scope, while the discipline as a whole took an increasingly officious, apologetic stance in the service of ideological orthodoxy (Simirenko 1976; Shalin 1978; Beliaev & Butorin 1982; Vaillancourt 1986; Greenfeld 1988).

Gorbachev’s ascent to power in 1985 marked another turning point for Soviet sociology. Once again hopes were riding high that sociology would free itself from the restraints of normative Marxism and take on Soviet society with all its contradictions and anomalies. This time, the hopes were not disappointed. The sociological renaissance in the Soviet Union had been noticed in the West, although the new trends in Soviet social science, dwarfed by the more spectacular developments in Gorbachev’s Russia, have not yet received the attention they deserve. What follows is an overview of recent changes in Soviet sociology. This survey does not pretend to be exhaustive. It is designed to convey the new climate in the social sciences by illuminating the institutional, substantive and methodological innovations in Soviet sociology. I will also try to assess the contribution that Soviet sociology has made to the reform process and its future impact on the course of perestroika. Finally, I will argue that research conducted by Soviet sociologists is potentially valuable to the discipline as a whole, insofar as it casts new light on some of the classical issues of sociological analysis.

The Ethical Underpinnings of Recent Soviet Sociology

The break with the past did not come overnight for sociologists in the Soviet Union. One would be hard-pressed to discern meaningful changes in the editorial policies of Sociological Research (SR), the official journal of the SSA, during Gorbachev’s first year in power. Even after Gorbachev unveiled his program of perestroika and unleashed the unprecedented campaign for glasnost there was at first little movement among sociologists. The official praise to the new Soviet leader and his program of economic acceleration was dutifully sung, but the calls for party spirit, class analysis, and ideological purity — the traditional virtues of Marxist social science — suggested business as usual.

The turning point for Soviet sociology came in November 1986, when Tatiana Zaslavskaiia, the newly elected president of the SSA, addressed the Association’s plenary meeting. Until now, charged Zaslavskaiia (1987), sociologists have done little to aid Gorbachev in his reform efforts. Social science remains timid, apologetic, and
largely irrelevant for the task at hand. Sociologists must help perestroika, and to do so they have to abandon their dogmatism, stop embellishing reality, and follow Soviet writers and journalists in studying real problems facing Soviet society. Good names must be restored to sociologists discredited in past ideological campaigns, continued Zaslavskaya, and their return to the field expedited in every way possible. The discipline's leading academic research center should be renamed the Institute of Sociology to reflect the field's status as an academic discipline in its own right. Comparing the sorry state of academic sociology in the USSR with American sociology's institutional strengths, Zaslavskaya demanded a radical overhaul of sociological education in the country, where sociology departments were still a rarity and the first cohort of professionally educated sociologists was not expected to graduate until 1989. All these measures, she concluded, are "the conditions for transformation of our science into a potent tool of perestroika" (Zaslavskaya 1987a:15; see also Zaslavskaya 1987b).

Soon after this path-breaking address, SR amended its editorial policy and issued an urgent call to Soviet sociologists to shake the deadly grip of the past. To legitimize the change, editorial writers offered a new selection of appropriate quotations from the classics, most notably from Lenin. If in the Brezhnev era code references were to the works where the founder of the Soviet state denounced factionalism and demanded the unity of action, the new excerpts highlighted the virtues of dissent and criticism. The editorial introduction to the May 1987 issue of SR featured a particularly dazzling array of fresh quotations from Lenin, including his rarely cited statement that "without the freedom of discussion and criticism the proletariat will not accept the unity of action" (Editorial 1987). As subsequent developments showed, many Soviet sociologists took these urgings close to heart.

In December 1987, a group of sociologists signed an open letter opposing the election of M.N. Rutkevich — past Director of the Institute of Sociological Research and the veteran of many ideological pogroms — to full membership in the USSR Academy of Science (Zaslavskaya et al. 1987). Soon after, the Academy's General Assembly rebuffed Rutkevich's bid for full membership by a vote of 163 to 62. This open letter, published by a leading Soviet newspaper, was remarkable not only as an indicator of the sociologists' newly found enthusiasm for glasnost, but also as a sign that the Party was prepared to adopt a hands-off attitude toward the internal politics in the academe. The whole affair served notice to the academic establishment that, from now on, nobody who gained power under the old administration was safe from criticism and could automatically count on Party support.

A spate of critical publications in late 1987 and 1988 fanned the flames of glasnost throughout Soviet social science. Reflecting on the plight of Soviet sociology in the last few decades, Alfred Baranov (1988) contended that without democratic institutions social science is unthinkable. This condition, he insisted, is far from being fulfilled in the country that just began taking steps toward democracy. The fight for sociological science, therefore, coincides with the struggle for democracy, to which social scientists ought to make a weighty contribution.

Gennadii Osipov (1987, 1988) sounded a similar theme. Deploiring the sleight of hand by which sociological science was replaced in the past by "social apologetics," Osipov blamed "bureaucratic dictatorship" for the indignities that Soviet sociologists suffered under past administrations and called on sociologists to redouble their efforts on behalf of perestroika.

Another sociologist (Ryvkina 1988) made a wry distinction between three types of social scientists formed during the stagnation era: "ideologists," whose main
function was to police others for ideological infractions; “pragmatists” or sociologists willing to tell the customers what they want to hear; and “researchers” committed to the ideals of free inquiry and criticism. This latter type, maintained Ryvkina, was pushed to the margins in recent years, yet it is the only authentic type of social scientist without which sociology cannot develop as a genuine science of society.

In a reflective article, titled “Professional Ethics of Sociology,” a group of Soviet social scientists stressed the need for a professional code that would guarantee against future abuses. “In the social atmosphere of stagnation,” contended the authors, (Lazar, Firsov & Iadov 1988:100), “sociology was superfluous. Which is why sociology in our country got off the ground twice: in the first decade after the October Revolution, and then, after a long break, in the 1950s.” Whenever the empirical data proved to be substantially at odds with dogmatic assumptions, charged the authors, the former were likely to be suspect. Sociology as a whole came to be seen as a dangerous source of information drain about the society’s systemic weaknesses, rather than as a self-correcting inquiry capable of guiding policy. Scientific ethics could not but suffer under these adverse conditions. “Fairness,” “courage,” “professional conscience,” even “plain decency,” fell victim to the partisan, intolerant atmosphere prevalent in the sociology of the Brezhnev era.

A series of articles by Soviet sociologists examined Stalinism and its enduring legacy. Bestuzhev-Lada (1988a) explored the sociopsychological roots of the nostalgia for the “good-old days” still palpable among Soviet people. For some, the author argued, denying the horrible crimes committed by Stalin was the way to cover up one’s personal involvement in past abuses. For others, particularly the young, the iron-fist rule symbolized by Stalin appeared as the antidote to the stagnation and apathy of the Brezhnev era. For the most part, the nostalgia for “the glorious past” was stirred by the acute sense that one’s life had lost its meaning, the feeling intensified by rapid change and confusion in the current climate of reforms.

Dzhrnazian (1988) took a different tack in tracing the sociopsychological roots of Stalinism. After running through a content analysis of some 160 verses about Stalin, the author came to the conclusion that the most common metaphors designating the leader — “bright son,” “great warrior,” “savior of the nations,” “irrepressible light,” etc. — suggest a reversion to the pagan imagery peculiar to pre-Christian worldviews, with its characteristic deification of man-God, wise and inscrutable, merciful and arbitrary at the same time. Stalin’s busts, ubiquitous during his rule, were akin to the pagan idols reminding mere mortals of their worthlessness in the face of the true God. The article did not tie Stalin’s pagan proclivities to his Georgian origins, but the fact that it was written by an Armenian (the rivalry between the two ethnic groups stretches back for centuries) must not have escaped Soviet readers.

Ionin (1987a, 1987b) concerned himself with a pattern of unreflectivity widespread in the nation and evident in the tendency to blame the system for past excesses while disclaiming a personal responsibility for the way things are. This tendency, found among scholars and nonscholars alike, suggests that Stalinism is not only a form of government but also a state of mind which persists long after the institutional foundations of Stalinism have been undermined. The question that confronts Soviet intellectuals today, urged the author, is the question of personal guilt, the Schuldfrage, similar to the one German intellectuals faced in the aftermath of Hitler’s fall. To answer it, we must ask ourselves, Where were we during the periods we now call “Stalinist,” “totalitarian,” “stagnant,” what was one’s share in the injustice done? Only after this question has been raised and answered, i.e., after
everyone has grown reflexive, subjecting to critical examination the conservative
mind-set inherited from the past, can one hope to transcend obsolete social
structures.

Two more pieces stand out in the self-reflexive literature of recent Soviet
sociology. These articles, written by Moscow sociologist Svetozar Efirov, are
noteworthy not only because their author pushes the arguments beyond the safe
limits observed by most champions of glasnost, but also because he calls attention
to the common bond between sociologists, East or West. What needs a thorough
reexamination, according to Efirov (1988a), is the attitude toward so-called
“bourgeois sociology.” This attitude remains largely defensive and apologetic.
Everything that comes from the pen of social scientists in the West tends to be
rejected offhand as “pseudo-scientific,” “class-motivated” and “disingenuous.”
Attempts by the opponents to pinpoint shortcomings and weaknesses in the
communist system are rebuffed as “slander,” “anti-Soviet propaganda,” “ideological
diversion,” or worse. The tacit assumption is that Soviet sociologists, armed with the
only correct theory, Marxism-Leninism, have already solved the problems with
which Western sociologists are grappling. This criticism, Efirov concedes, must also
be seen as self-criticism, for in the past the author himself practiced the art of
partisan scholarship and engaged in apologetic discourse. There is much that Soviet
social scientists could learn from their Western counterparts, sums up the author,
and their works should be treated with courtesy and respect regardless of the
writers’ origins or beliefs.

In another essay, titled “‘Blank Spots’: Imaginary Dialogue on the Limits of
Glasnost” (Efirov 1988b), Efirov points out that numerous taboos persist in the
regime of glasnost, the sensitive areas still off-limits for free discussion. The editors
continue to shy away from such topics as the Communist Party’s responsibility for
past excesses, multiparty politics, the nomenklatura system of promotions, and the
bureaucrats’ monopoly on privilege. Whenever such subjects are brought up, the
inner censor steps in to remind us that there are limits beyond which free inquiry
dare not go. All these practices, concluded Efirov, must cease if Soviet sociology is
to live up to the lofty name of science.

The spirit permeating Soviet sociology, as one could gather from the above, is
intensely ethical and self-reflexive. It is somewhat akin to the soul-searching among
Soviet geneticists who, following Khrushchev’s break with the Stalinist past,
renounced Lysenko, a powerful member of the Soviet scientific establishment, whose
ideologically motivated theories caused great damage to genetics and microbiologi-
cal studies in the USSR. In both cases, restoring the ethical norms governing
scientific inquiry emerged as the first order of the day. In the case of Soviet
sociology, this is evident in “The Professional Code of Ethics” recently adopted by
the SSA (Professionalnyi Kodeks 1988). The Code urges all sociologists to cultivate
“tolerance and respect” toward opponents, show “courage of conviction,” shun
“ideological labels,” and avoid appeals to “authorities” in settling scientific disputes.
To underscore its commitment to new ways of doing sociology, the SSA voted to
establish the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics, which includes the most
prominent Soviet sociologists, many of them victims of past ideological purges.

Now, if we take a closer look at the Soviet sociologists’ stance, we can notice an
instructive tension in its premises. I am talking about the tension between scholar-
ship and advocacy. On the one hand, we find here a definite shift away from “the
ethos of ideology,” with its intolerance to criticism, suppression of free inquiry, and
subservience to extant powers (Shalin 1979), and toward the values of universalism,
revisionism, and objectivity which Robert Merton (1973) identified as “the ethos of science.” On the other hand, we can clearly see here a self-conscious attempt to promote sociology as “a tool of perestroika,” “an aid to reform,” to make it a valuable resource in the Communist Party’s political agenda. This is where Soviet sociologists appear to part company with their counterparts in the natural sciences. Whereas the latter (e.g., Soviet geneticists) wish to insulate their science from the political struggles of the day, Soviet sociologists (a good many of them at any rate) insist on being advocates, claim special status for their science as an instrument of social reconstruction, and yet continuously profess their allegiance to the ideals of scholarship.

Have Soviet sociologists found a via media between political engagement and scholarly detachment? We shall have to wait for a definitive answer to this query, but so far, I believe, the answer has been largely in the affirmative. Having reasserted their commitment to professional integrity and free inquiry, sociologists in the Soviet Union set out to gather a vast pool of data illuminating the multiple failures of the rigid command economy, data that can be used, and is being used, for articulating the present reform agenda.

It was Zaslavskaia’s famous memo on the unwieldy bureaucracy and its vested interests that provided Gorbachev with ammunition in his attacks on the well-entrenched opponents of reforms (see The New York Times report for July 4, 1987). A spirited defense of family farming and cooperative enterprises by Soviet social scientists laid the foundation for the legislation authorizing new forms of property under socialism (Shmelev 1985; Tsypko 1986). The writings by Kon (1988), among others, sounded many themes that would become standard in the Party’s campaign for ethical regeneration, personal initiative, and democratic renewal in the nation. There are some indications that sociologists, along side other Soviet social scientists, serve on government-sponsored task-force teams and furnish the Party with data instrumental in formulating social policy. Thus Zaslavskaia and Grushin, respectively director and deputy director of the National Center for Public Opinion Research, gather information on public opinion believed to be used by Gorbachev and his aids. A number of Soviet sociologists (e.g., Lauristin, Titma, Zaslavskaia) have been elected to the new Congress of People’s Deputies, and some have reached positions of power in the party apparatus. Not to be overlooked, also, are the sociologists’ increasingly weighty contributions to general public discourse in the Soviet Union. These contributions are made through the popular press (e.g., Batygin 1987; Popov 1988; Levada 1988; Levada & Sheinis 1988; Bestuzhev-Lada 1988a; Titma 1988; Voronina 1988; Zaslavskaia 1988c) as well as through professional outlets. An example of the latter is the unprecedented series of roundtable discussions organized by Sociological Research. One of them, on the meaning of socialist pluralism, allowed participants to voice their support for dissent as a vital component of democratic structures and raised the possibility of a multiparty system in the USSR (Sotsialisticheskii Pluralism 1988). Another panel dealt with strikes and labor-management disputes and led to the acknowledgement that in a socialist state the workers’ right to strike must be protected by law (Zabastovki v SSSR 1989). One more occasion that attracted public attention was a lively exchange about youth culture, where young people’s needs for independence, self-expression, and informal organizations were emphasized (Rok 1987). It is a measure of sociology’s growing popularity with Soviet readers that between 1987 and 1988 SR doubled its circulation. One might add that for the first time, beginning in 1989, the journal’s copies are being sold in general newsstands.
Gauging the exact impact of these various contributions on the political process in the country is not an easy task, yet it seems fair to say that sociologists' influence on public discourse and public policy in the nation has not been negligible. Perhaps the best indicator of sociology's growing role in the nation's affairs is the June 12, 1988, decree by the CPSU Central Committee, titled "Enhancing the Role of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in the Solution of Critical Problems of Soviet Society" (O Povyshenii 1988). This remarkable document, which demonstrates that the Party perceives sociology as a resource and an ally, helped advance several objectives that Soviet sociologists sought to accomplish for decades. The decree sanctioned the renaming of the Institute of Sociological Research as the Institute of Sociology and laid grounds for transforming the SSA bimonthly official journal into a monthly publication. It mandated revamping the system of sociological education in the country, with the leading universities directed to establish undergraduate and graduate programs in sociology. The Ministry of Higher Education and related agencies were instructed to develop a new curriculum for the discipline and to prepare sociology textbooks for mass production. The same decree advised sociologists to pay special attention to public opinion studies, with the National Center for Public Opinion Research designated a leading institution in this area.

As I will argue below, the bond that Soviet sociologists have forged between their science and present party policies is not without serious risks. For the time being, however, this alliance of scholarship and advocacy has paid handsomely. It strengthened the discipline's institutional base, affirmed its autonomy from the more orthodox branches of Marxism-Leninism (i.e., historical materialism and scientific communism), and above all, generated sociological research that seemed unthinkable just a few years ago.

The Scope of Recent Soviet Sociology

The first thing that catches the reader's eye in recent issues of Sociological Research is an unusually broad range of topics opened for sociological inquiry. Prostitution, suicide, drug abuse, organized crime, underground economy — for decades these problems were swept under the rug and proclaimed inimical to the socialist way of life. Now a growing body of empirical studies is devoted to these subjects.

A pioneering sociological study of prostitution in the Soviet Republic of Georgia appeared in the November 1987 issue of Sociological Research (Gabiani & Manuilskii 1987). This research, based on interviews with 532 prostitutes who "came under the purview of the Georgian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]," revealed that 73.3% had a high school or some college education; 91.1% were employed at present or had been employed in the past; 49.9% were sexually active by the age of 17; half were divorced at the time of the interview, and as many had children. An average prostitute earns from 20 to 50 rubles per client, though the elite could make several times as much. The authors noted the connection between the family background (3/4 were raised by other than their natural parents or came from troubled families) and the recruitment into the trade. They blamed widespread social injustice during the stagnation years as a major cause of prostitution in the USSR.

Another piece on the subject (Golod 1988) promulgated the thesis that legal prohibitions and more law enforcement are not the best ways to cope with the problem. Restrictive sexual morality, suggested the author, might be conducive to prostitution. The author presented data on premarital sexual activity among Soviet youth, which pointed to the increasingly tolerant attitudes of young people toward
sex as a legitimate form of self-expression. Golod did not address directly the question of whether prostitution can be eliminated under socialism, but his article could be read to the effect that a more liberal attitude toward nonmarital sex, reenforced by a sensitive program of sex education, might undercut the conditions favorable to prostitution.

Perhaps the most forthright piece on the subject was written by Gilinskii (1988:70). In his article "How Effective is the Ban on Prostitution?" the author argued that "as long as a money economy exists, prostitution will be with us, and no urgings and decrees will make it go away." Given the fact that some form of market-oriented economy is currently prescribed by Soviet leaders as an answer to the nation's economic woes, the conclusion one draws from Gilinskii's article is unambiguous: prostitution is here to stay in Soviet society.

Data on suicide have been a closely guarded secret in the Soviet Union, the last batch of statistics in this area being published in the 1920s. In recent months, the Soviet press has revealed that the suicide rates in the USSR are on par with such countries as the United States and Norway. In 1965, 39,550 Soviet citizens took their own lives; the figure grew steadily in the next ten years, peaked at 81,417 in 1984, and then declined measurably. In 1987, the last year for which data are available, there were 54,105 successful suicide attempts in the Soviet Union. In the same year, the suicide rate for Leningrad, the second largest Soviet city, was 15 per 100,000 of the population (Vedeneeva 1989).

Two theoretical articles on suicide, its motives and causes, have recently appeared in SR. Observing that the very term "suicide" is absent in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Ambrumova and Postovalova (1987) urged sociologists to reclaim the area for their investigations. Divorce, migration, and marginalization — factors endemic to all modern societies, according to the authors — are the major causes of suicide in the Soviet Union. Another paper summarized a series of inquiries conducted in Leningrad between 1971 and 1982 (Gilinskii & Smolinskii 1988). The data it furnished point to a pattern of suicide common to most industrial nations. Men are three times as likely to take their own lives as women in the Soviet Union, though women are more likely to make unsuccessful attempts at suicide. Men and women between 40 and 49 years of age are the most prone to suicide. Young people (29 years and younger) account for 37% of all suicide attempts; 41.6% of those attempting suicide and 63.4% of those who succeeded in their attempts did not finish high school; 53.7% of all suicides in the studies under review were workers, with unskilled laborers dominating the group. College-educated people account for 10.3%, students for 5.5%, and retirees for 15% of all suicides. The authors noticed an increase in suicide rates in past decades, which they tied to the deformations in social life under the Brezhnev rule: "Among the factors conducive to suicide (as well as to other forms of deviance) most salient are the unsatisfied needs for self-assertion and self-expression. Under such circumstances humans tend to feel that their lives have lost meaning — the situation typical for all suicidal behavior (we are talking about suicide attempted by normal people). Which is why during the years of stagnation and social apathy, the leveling tendencies increase the danger of suicide" (Gilinskii & Smolinskii 1988:58).

The first sociological study of drug addicts in the USSR was published by Gabiani (1987). This survey of registered drug addicts in the Soviet Republic of Georgia brought to light the persistent nature of the problem, especially among Soviet youth. One third of all registered addicts in the Republic are under 25; 91.7% are men; 87.1% are urban dwellers; 83.8% have a high school diploma or some
college education; and nearly half are married, and most of those married have
children. Multiple drug use is the norm: 83.9% of addicts tried hashish, 46.7%
morphine, 43.8% opium, 11.7% cocaine, and 2% heroin; 30.8% of all respondents
spend from 20 to 100 rubles a month to support the habit, and about one third
spend from 500 to 3,000 rubles. Gabiani acknowledged the limitations of his data,
i.e., the fact that his project deals exclusively with registered addicts. This, of course,
is true of all statistics on substance abuse in the USSR, which deals only with
institutionalized and/or registered addicts.4

Questionnaires and interviews are the two most common methods of sociologi-
cal research in the Soviet Union today. About half of all space in SR is given to
opinion surveys of one kind or another. Attitudes toward glasnost and perestroika
(Michurin 1987; Britvin 1988; Raig 1988; Alexeev 1988; Valzev & Kolodizh 1988;
Toshchenko et al. 1988); private plots in agriculture (Samsonov 1988); the election
of managers at state enterprises (Zaslavskaya 1988b; Kapelush 1988); social justice
(Iliasov & Muhametberdiev 1988; Ponikarova & Dunin 1988); premarital sex and
marriage (Navaitis 1988; Borisov 1989; Krasovskii 1988); war and peace through the
eyes of Soviet and American children (Popov et al. 1988); most popular theater
shows (Kliavina & Khshanovskaya 1988); rock-and-roll and youth culture (Meinert
1987); tax use in urban areas (Tveretskii 1987); students’ perception of social
sciences (Vasileva et al. 1987) — these are some of the issues and topics about which
Soviet sociologists polled citizens in the last three years. National sample surveys are
rare among these undertakings; respondents tend to be drawn from the Russian
Federated Republic; questions of representativeness are often left unanswered. All
these limitations make generalizations about various Soviet republics, ethnic groups,
and the country as a whole difficult. But the research is instructive nonetheless, as
it points to the deep-seated ambivalence that Soviet people feel about their life, their
immediate future, and the pace and direction of perestroika.

A survey by Iliasov and Muhametberdiev (1988) illuminates a pervasive
pattern of corruption in the Soviet Republic of Turkmenia, where at least every third
person has encountered extortion attempts from public officials. Particularly
common patterns of corruption are in health-care institutions, colleges and
universities, and trade professions. Bribe-taking might not be as routine outside
Soviet Central Asia, but reports in the Soviet press indicate that the phenomenon is
widespread in other regions as well.

Only 41.6% of the respondents, according to one national survey (Toshchenko
et al. 1988), are satisfied with the pace of reform in the country. This percentage
drops further (20.1%) when the question is asked about the situation at the
respondents’ enterprises. Sixty percent of those surveyed in this study doubt that the
hard work demanded by the current economic policies would significantly affect
their pay. Over half of the respondents claim that they have suggested ways to
improve the situation in their workplace, yet only 7% saw their recommendations
enacted by the administration. Britvin (1988) reports similar data from his survey of
Moscow workers who feel that their criticism of obsolete practices receives little
attention from the authorities. Many respondents in the last study voiced their
unhappiness with the level of glasnost and the decision-making process at their
enterprises, most notably when it comes to matters like housing allocation, criticism
of administration, and cutting through the red tape.

Not only Soviet workers are unsure about perestroika and its impact on
everyday life. Similar patterns of ambivalence are found among Soviet scholars
(Michurin 1987). The absolute majority (84%) supports perestroika, but only 16% of
the respondents are pleased with the pace of reforms; 31.4% find it unsatisfactory; and 32.3% detect no visible changes since the country embarked on a new course.

One interesting insight that recent sociological studies have to offer is that public opinion in the Soviet Union is not entirely behind Gorbachev in his efforts to privatize the economy. The initially sympathetic attitude toward private entrepreneurship is apparently giving way to a feeling of concern and doubt. Nearly half of the Soviet people now mistrust and/or categorically oppose newly founded cooperative enterprises, which are widely blamed for high prices and questionable business practices (Ulybin 1988). Another survey (Ponikarova & Dunin 1988) brings to light this intriguing fact: the opportunity to augment one's income under present economic reforms is not uniformly welcome by Soviet workers, many of whom prefer a more egalitarian income distribution to a system that rewards individual efforts and breeds sizable disparity in incomes. Letters to the editor of a major Soviet newspaper analyzed by a team of sociologists (Naumova & Rogovin 1987) show that many Soviet people are uneasy about the growing disparity in wealth. Corruption and illegal profiteering under Brezhnev, according to the authors, are in part to blame for the population's suspicious attitude toward personal wealth. But the study seems to imply, also, that the social stratification spurred by the new policies could meet the resistance of those who fail to benefit personally from the present economic reforms.

Theoretical Advances in Recent Soviet Sociology

Few sociological studies conducted in the Soviet Union before 1988 raise significant theoretical questions, and even fewer attempt to assess their implications for Marxism as a general sociological theory. A typical Soviet survey is designed to fill some crying gap, to satisfy the nation's hunger for information long denied to the public. Were the nation's statistic-gathering agencies in better shape, some of the research done by Soviet sociologists might have been unnecessary. To be sure, there are social scientists who venture into policy questions and offer recommendations to the authorities, but most are content to sound the alarm. Beginning in 1988, however, alongside descriptive, exploratory works, more ambitious projects have begun to crop up, that tackle difficult theoretical questions and take on the socialist society as a whole. A good example is the inquiry into alienation under socialism.

Almost two decades ago, when Soviet social science still felt the momentum generated by Khrushchev's liberal reforms, some sociologists intimated that it would be unrealistic to expect a socialist country to be entirely free from alienation (after all, socialism is understood in Marxist theory as a transitional stage on the path from capitalism to communism). At the time, these modest attempts at critical reflection met violent resistance from the ideological watchdogs who denounced such arguments as revisionism and ideological diversion. Starting up in the late 1980s where his predecessors left off in the 1960s, Anatolii Kostin (1988:8) advanced the thesis that in past Soviet history, "the whole array of adverse developments had occurred (a sharp conflict between societal, collective and personal interests; serious imbalances in distributive policies; cutting workers off from the decisions affecting their vital interests), which justify raising the question of the mechanisms of alienation being part of their dynamics." Pushing his argument one step further, the author asked: "Does the new [socialist] society inherit the problem from capitalism, or does it, at some point, generate its own conditions conducive to alienation?"
The bulk of this work is devoted to the patterns of ownership and their historical transformation in the USSR. The analysis starts at the close of the NEP era, when multiple forms of ownership over the means of production were replaced with state property in industry and collective property in agriculture. Then it proceeds to the post-World War II era, focusing in particular on the 1960s and 1970s, when state property triumphed (in substance if not in name) throughout the Soviet economy. The progressive socialization of the means of production in the country, according to the author, was accompanied by numerous deformations. The state apparatus grew precipitously; the central authorities adopted the command methods of governing; the working collectives were increasingly left out from the decision-making process; members of the bureaucratic establishment secured for themselves privileged access to scarce resources; and workers, conscious of social injustice, found themselves powerless and estranged from their nominal representatives. In theory, the means of production in the nation remained socialist, but in practice, public property was perceived as "nobody's," "free-for-all," thus increasing the sense of alienation on the workers' part.

To back up these assertions, the author conducted a survey designed to elicit the workers' and engineers' response to questions like, "Do you feel like a master at your enterprise?" "Can you say that your personal interests and the interests of your collective coincide?" "Is the current pay system fair and does it stimulate your work?" Only 27.7% of the respondents at a car-assembly plant in Kaluga reported that they counted themselves as masters at their enterprises and perceived their working collectives as the place where their opinion mattered. The figure was lower (21.1%) for the workers in the industrial centers of Lipetsk and Stavropol regions. Forty percent of all respondents expressed no desire to work harder and be socially active because they thought their efforts were unlikely to be rewarded. The majority approved of perestroika in general, but 30% of those questioned felt that the current reforms were just another campaign waged by the Communist Party and were unlikely to improve the situation so far as their working environment was concerned.

One could quibble with the author's sampling technique and the way he operationalized the term "alienation," but his data definitely raise the possibility that socialism may breed forms of alienation all its own. This conclusion is borne out by various recent developments in the USSR, most signally by the current wave of strikes. The fact that strikes, a rarity under previous Soviet regimes, began to spread after Gorbachev came to power does not prove that alienation is of a recent origin. In the past, according to Lipskii (1989), strikes were not a viable form of protest for Soviet workers because participants faced reprisals from the government. Workers showed their resentment in other ways: through absenteeism, by turning defective products, producing low-quality goods, quitting their jobs, or stealing from their enterprises. Liberalization under Gorbachev made possible more adversarial methods of fighting social injustice, and these are likely to continue as long as workers are "cut off from participation in decisions affecting their vital interests" (Lipskii 1989:32).

Strikes in the USSR have multiple origins and aim at different objectives. Some, like the nationalist strikes in Nagorno-Karabakh and Erevan, stem from decades of neglect and mistreatment of the minorities by the local Party bosses (Pogosian 1989). Others reflect income loss in the wake of the new economic reforms which placed on enterprises the burden of showing profit without providing managers with the requisite freedom of marketing, price-setting, and securing supplies (Baidin 1989;
Iakushev 1989). An even more troubling source of workers’ discontent is diminishing employment opportunities. The situation is most serious in Soviet Central Asia and Transcaucasia. From 1979 to 1985, unemployment rose by 11% in Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic, the young people making up the bulk of the unemployed (Islamov & Travin 1989:47). In Dagestan, 170,000 working adults were unemployed in 1988 (Aitov 1989:121). The Soviet Republic of Belorussia projects that in the next few years, 200,000 people (6.2% of the entire industrial workforce) will lose their current jobs (Zaslavskii & Moskvina 1989:37). Laid-off workers are, in principle, entitled to some alternatives proffered by state employment bureaus, but the situation is complicated by an array of factors that make job change a truly frightening prospect. With the transfer to another enterprise workers may lose the housing provided by their employers and, in some cases, their city residence permits. Almost invariably, the forced transfer is accompanied by an income loss. Only 4% of the respondents who recently lost their jobs were notified about the upcoming change two to three months in advance (as required by law), while 57% learned about the administration’s decision two to three weeks before the lay-off (Zaslavskii & Moskvina 1989:41). It is premature to talk about unemployment in the Soviet Union as a chronic problem (with an exception of certain regions in Central Asia and Transcaucasia), but with the all-out drive to increase productivity and cut down to size the managerial staff currently under way, the employment situation is likely to deteriorate, increasing the potential for labor unrest in the future.

Given all that, it is hardly surprising that more writers openly voice their skepticism about “the myth that under socialism the worker is a true master of the enterprise” (Naziyoma 1989:36), talk about “alienated labor,” and even hint that exploitation may be a part of socialism as a socioeconomic system. Here is an example of heavy rhetoric employed by a Soviet sociologist:

The strike is the plight of the oppressed. Let’s not mince words. In the social sense, oppression is the denigration of human dignity, the reduction of the living standards to a bare minimum. . . . In the economic sense, oppression is exploitation, i.e., expropriation of unpaid labor, and not just the use of labor force. Such expropriation might take different forms, including misappropriation of public means (equipment, materials, transportation) for personal gain. The widespread abuse of power, like the “free of charge” construction of garages and private resorts for the bosses, is one of the indicators of the hidden exploitation of labor (Kravchenko 1989:28).

What this and other Soviet sociologists appear to be saying (even if rarely in so many words) is that the exploitation of labor does not disappear in a socialist society, that it emerges in new guises, which can produce alienation-like symptoms and spur open actions against socialist authorities. The ownership form, therefore, cannot be an antidote to alienation in and of itself; the radical socialization of the means of production may stamp out some of its manifestations, but it generates new ones, crying for fresh theoretical and empirical examination. Clearly, the last group of writers is no longer content to dispose of the problem by laying the blame squarely at the door of past administrations. The question is reframed to allow the possibility that socialism as a system might cause deformations, that its advancement incurs human costs (the loss of meaning and motivation, the diminished sense of mastery, the failure of the distributive justice system), and that some of these developments are phenomena sui generis rather than the “birthmarks of capitalism” well on their way to extinction.

One more area where Soviet sociologists are now making significant strides, an area of considerable theoretical import, deserves to be mentioned here. It roughly
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coincides with what Western sociologists call “bureaucratic rationalization” and covers the structure of power and authority, the impact of technology on society, and more broadly, the future of industrial civilization. An interest in this subject is prompted by the need to explain the origins of the rigid bureaucratic apparatus, *nomenklatura*, that frustrates current reform efforts and is directly tied to the injustices of past Soviet regimes. The ecological disasters (Chernobyl is only one of the many that has befallen the Soviet Union in recent years) are also a factor that compels a reassessment of technology and industrialism by social scientists in the USSR.

Zaslavskaia was probably the first among Soviet sociologists to harness this problematic in explicating the rigidities of the Soviet economic and political system. In a memorandum on the Soviet economy leaked to Western reporters in the early 1980s, she zeroed in on a social group with a particular stake in the status quo, bureaucratic apparatchiks, and exposed their overriding concerns with protecting turf, augmenting power, suppressing dissenters, and undermining reform efforts that could threaten the status quo. In her recent statements, Zaslavskaia (1988c) has developed the thesis further; her argument is that the bureaucratic apparatus in the USSR grew into a social strata that not only established a monopoly on the means of administration but also was well on its way to becoming a social class, insofar as its members effectively controlled the means of production and secured a privileged access to public wealth. “What we have learned lately about our society’s order and functioning under Stalinism and Brezhnevism, I believe, allows us at the very least to talk about indirect exploitation by the *nomenklatura* stratum of the rest of the population.” This is hardly what socialism was expected to be, she observed; the Soviet socioeconomic system is comprised of diverse, incompatible elements, including Asiatic despotism and state-monopolistic capitalism, that undermine the familiar adage about “mature socialism” being built in the USSR. Even the label “socialistic in general” may be too generous in reference to present Soviet society.

The best hopes for changing the status quo, for dislodging bureaucracy, lie in the general public’s readiness to get directly involved with perestroika, join informal organizations, form what Zaslavskaia designated “popular fronts” — voluntary organizations that would provide a political base strong enough to counter “the concentration of power, rights and privileges in the hands of executive apparatus.” The subsequent flourishing of the popular front movements in the Baltic Republics and elsewhere in the Soviet Union suggests that the scenario outlined by Zaslavskaia has been taken seriously.

Nikolai Popov (1988) has explored the forms of authority and power dominating much of Soviet history. Popov paid special attention to Stalin’s charismatic authority and “the ideal totalitarian state” he built, in which “his personal reign extended over everything — economics and science, literature and art.” The emergence of such a state was facilitated by the Russian political tradition with its characteristically weak democratic institutions and a powerful bureaucratic estate. In Stalin’s time, this group “grew overabundantly, increasingly separating itself from the masses and forming a powerful machine of professional officeholders.” This apparatus survived the leader’s death. From the 1960s on, we witness the formation of “a vast, self-enclosed caste of professional bosses, which we usually refer to as a power elite when we talk about other countries.” The cure for the social disease of bureaucracy, according to the author, is the strict separation of powers, strengthening the legal protection of individual rights, and resuming the buildup of civic culture interrupted by the October Revolution.

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Ionin (1987a) grounded his criticism of the Soviet bureaucratic system in the ideas borrowed in part from the Frankfurt School. He linked the loss of meaning and identity in a bureaucratically ossified Soviet state to the "rational-technocratic principle" that has dominated the 20th century and industrial societies, including the one Stalin nurtured into being in the 1930s. Under this principle, ultimate rationality and true agency are vested in impersonal structures, whereas individuals are denigrated to the status of cogs in a superhuman machine, their will and consciousness kept in check by the higher authorities possessed by the idea of omniscience and administrative activism. The rush to industrialize the nation, to make Soviet society rational in every respect, had as one of its unanticipated consequences the deification of technocratic, expert rationality. Endowed with sacred — scientific — validity, expert rationality gradually subordinated to itself other considerations as insignificant, merely subjective. This technocratic mentality bred a peculiar form of "socialist conservatism" which continues to dominate the mass consciousness long after Stalin's cult of personality was exposed and the stagnation of Brezhnev's years subjected to criticism. The bureaucratization of the mind, i.e., the deification of objective reason incorporated in the bureaucratic apparatus and the concomitant denigration of subjectivity and self, will continue until humans strip expert rationality of its halo of sacredness and subject it to a thorough criticism.

Davydov (1986, 1988) is perhaps the most sophisticated of those sociological critics in the USSR who have taken on Soviet bureaucracy and technocracy in recent years. His departure point is Weber's theory of bureaucratic rationalization and its central distinction between substantive and formal rationality. Guardians of formal rationality have a tendency to take themselves for granted and look for no other reasons beyond considerations of technical efficiency. The direct outgrowth of this tendency is the "mythologization of technique" or "techno-bureaucratization" of the modern world. At its early stage, the concentration of resources, expertise, and administrative techniques accompanying bureaucratic rationalization helps achieve important goals, such as the increase in productivity and abundance of material goods. This early model of rationalization (Davydov calls it "American") has exhausted its potential; it has allowed too much responsibility to be delegated to the administrative apparatus. The limits of technocratic rationality can be seen in the ecological imbalances, massive failures of high technology, and the impunity with which the guardians of instrumental reason can commit their costly mistakes. The greatest weakness of instrumental reason is that it fails to tap the creative potential of the masses involved in the industrial process. This is where the second model of rationalization (Davydov calls it "Japanese") comes into play. It is marked by the development of highly skilled, responsible and active workers willing and able to take the cause of the rationalizing and humanizing industrial environment as their own. The task to be accomplished is "technization without bureaucracy, in other words, a version of technical progress that does not incur inordinate costs which bring humanity to the brink of global disaster." Soviet society, Davydov contends, is still in the first phase of bureaucratic rationalization, with all its drawbacks clearly visible to the naked eye. It is none too soon, however, to start thinking about the second stage, about subordinating formal rationality to a substantive one, and cutting down to size the genie of unrestrained industrialism. This task confronts all industrial societies, socialist and capitalist alike; it is a global challenge, the meeting of which affords an opportunity for the world community to realize its unity.
Conclusion: Soviet Sociologists Between Scholarship and Advocacy

In his *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas (1984, 1987) delineated the conditions for undistorted communication, which any society that aspires to be rational must meet. Among other things, these conditions include separation of knowledge and power claims, unlimited access of interested parties to public discourse, and discursive validation of validity claims as a basis for consensus building and democratic will formation. Communications that meet these exacting standards may never be found in reality, yet the ideal speech situation they designate serves as a useful foil against which we can judge how rational a particular society or community is. From this vantage point, we can see that sociologists in the Soviet Union have made considerable strides in ridding their professional communications of distortions and democratizing public discourse in the nation as a whole.

Soviet sociologists have publicly committed themselves to the ideals of free inquiry, as evidenced by the critical examination of the discipline's past and the Professional Code of Ethics adopted by the Soviet Sociological Association. Instructive also are the attempts to overcome the traditionally defensive attitude toward Western sociology. The publication in *SR* of Kai Erikson's presidential address on alienation, as well as a systematic attempt to familiarize Soviet audiences with the works of Weber, Schutz, Sorokin, and other sociological classics, all point to a renewed interest of Soviet scholars in the dialogue with Western sociologists. The growing body of exchanges and joint research projects undertaken by Soviet and American sociologists (Fisher 1989) is another sign that sociologists in the Soviet Union are ready to join the world sociological community.

These momentous developments have been backed by important institutional changes. Sociology in the Soviet Union has shaken its suzerainty to the more orthodox branches of Marxism and asserted its separate academic status. With the Institute of Sociology in the process of reorganization and new sociology programs lodged in major universities, one could anticipate further consolidation of the sociological profession in the USSR.

In substantive terms, the last few years have witnessed a significant expansion in the range of problems open to sociological analysis, with new areas once closed to sociological inquiry brought into the discipline's purview. The entire field of sociological study is due for a major overhaul. "I believe that the conceptual apparatus of sociology ought to undergo change to reflect the new reality," wrote one Soviet scholar,

"[for old concepts] helped form in the public mind a linear, closed model of socialism that, as we now realize, had little to do with objective reality. Organized crime and corruption ingrained in much of our governing system, criminal youth gangs terrorizing the population of many cities — these are also elements of reality which sociology must study. Add to this the alienation of labor, hidden exploitation, the commodified nature of labor, limited private enterprise in the form of individual and cooperative business activities, stock market and mixed enterprises, strikes and perhaps even unemployment will soon enter the problem area of sociological science (Kravchenko 1989:28).

Methodologically, we see a far greater reliance on opinion surveys in Soviet sociology today. Questions about perestroika, the electoral system, cooperative enterprises, the administration's attitude toward workers' needs, and so forth, have produced some interesting data about the nation's public opinion, including an important insight into the Soviet people's ambivalence toward the pace and
Perhaps the most significant among the recent innovations is the growing readiness on the part of Soviet sociologists to raise serious sociological questions about the nature of their political system, bureaucratic rationalization under socialism, nationalization of the means of production, and alienation of labor. Whether or not their discipline can regain its status as a genuinely scientific endeavor will in large measure depend on whether Soviet sociologists continue grappling with such theoretically relevant questions. The problem, of course, is that these issues are not only theoretically relevant but also value-laden and politically sensitive. They go to the heart of the social reconstruction now under way in the Soviet Union, and for that very reason, one has to be concerned for Soviet sociology's future.

As I have shown above, the sociological renaissance in the USSR comes on the heels of Gorbachev's reforms. It is intricately tied to the fate of the reform-minded wing in the Communist Party. There is nothing inherently unsavory about the alliance between scholarship and politics, sociology and reform. We may recall that at the dawn of sociology in the US, American social scientists also sought to legitimize their discipline by promising to aid progressive reforms (Fine 1976; Shalin 1988). I would argue, along with Dewey (1916), Merton (1973), and many others, that sociological research as a scientific endeavor can thrive only in a specific political system—democracy. We can invert the last statement and say that democracy is impossible without free inquiry, that the uncoerced examination of reality—physical or social, natural or supernatural—nourishes the democratic process. When Soviet sociologists throw their weight behind Gorbachev's program of glasnost and democratization, therefore, they do more than curry favor with the extant powers and gain grounds on their academic rivals; they fight for their discipline's heart and soul.

But what happens if the current political climate changes, if the forces of perestroika are defeated, if Gorbachev changes his tune, realizing that his reforms could undermine the Party's reign over society? Will Soviet sociologists change their tune as well, or will they challenge the Party's monopoly on wisdom? A closer examination of the current situation suggests that these questions are hardly rhetorical. Power considerations continue to impinge on the questions of truth in the Soviet Union. Thus along with the paens to free inquiry and scholarly integrity, we find in the Professional Code of Soviet Sociology familiar references to "the party spirit," partiiinost, heralded as a guiding principle of sociological analysis. Now, if this is taken to mean that sociologists are entitled to their political views and can join any party they wish, this is a welcome statement. But if, as in the past, this principle obligates sociologists to follow the official line enunciated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Shalin 1980), this is something entirely different.

Already one can sense that the Party's interpretation of the nation's past diverges from the one articulated by more daring social scientists. Whereas the official view tends to exonerate socialism and blame past administrations for enormous losses sustained by the country, sociologists are beginning to focus on the systemic weaknesses of socialism as a socioeconomic formation. The latter interpretation is yet to be fully articulated and publicly accepted by the sociological community, but its outlines are already visible, and sooner or later it is bound to come into conflict with the self-serving utterances of the Communist Party. As long as the arguments challenging the legitimacy of the CPSU and the superiority of socialism remain taboo in the Soviet Union, public discourse in general and sociological
discourse in particular will remain distorted, and substantive/value claims subordinated to the instrumental/power considerations.

The fight Soviet sociologists are waging should concern their colleagues in the West, for the questions they probe — alienation and bureaucracy, social justice and privilege, employment and labor unrest, ecology and industrialism — are central to the discipline as a whole. Unlike their Western counterparts, Soviet sociologists can explore firsthand how these phenomena manifest themselves under socialism, which problems their social system solves and which ones generates anew. Unfortunately, there is not much that Western sociologists can do to aid their colleagues in the Soviet Union. Personal contacts and joint research are helpful, to be sure, but in the end social scientists in the USSR will have to rely on themselves to insure that sociology in the glasnost era does not share the plight of its predecessors. Meanwhile, we should follow closely the progress of Soviet sociology and be prepared to speak out in support of our common cause.

Notes

1. Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia, a bimonthly journal published by the Soviet Sociological Association, is the best Russian source of up-to-date sociological studies conducted in the USSR. Those unfamiliar with the Russian language will find helpful Soviet Sociology, A Journal of Translations, published quarterly by M.E. Scharpe. Useful materials can also be found in a monthly Soviet Education, A Journal of Translations and a bimonthly The Soviet Review, A Journal of Translations. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, a weekly publication sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the American Council of Learned Societies, offers excerpts from general Soviet newspapers and periodicals.

2. Most of the scholars engaged in sociological research in the Soviet Union today have received their formal education and hold graduate degrees in philosophy, economics, or history (Greenfeld 1988:101-2). Until recently, there have been only two departments with undergraduate programs in sociology, one at Leningrad State University and the other at Urals State University. Graduate training in sociology is offered by the Institute of Sociology, USSR Academy of Science, and some graduate courses are taught at Moscow State University. This situation is likely to change with the recent passing of the decree on the state of sociology in the Soviet Union (see discussion below).

3. M. Titma, a prominent sociologist and vice president of the SSA, has recently been chosen as secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee.

4. According to the official figures reported by the State Committee on Statistics (see Goskomstat 1989:141), the Soviet Republic of Turkmenia had the highest proportion of registered addicts in 1987 (129.9 per 100,000 of the population), followed by the Ukraine (32.4) and the Republic of Kirkizia (29.0). The Russian Federated Republic tops the list of registered alcoholics (209 per 100,000 of the population), with Latvia a close second (1997), followed by Moldavia (1948) and Belorussia (1879). The full extent of substance abuse in the Soviet Union remains unknown.

5. There are indications that Soviet sociologists are becoming more critical of survey techniques and are turning their sight to qualitative methods. A.V. Dmitriev, SR editor, deplored in his recent editorial comments “the average person, this strangely mathematized concept of dogmatic thinking that reflects the notion of man as the ‘product of a system,” and called for a new emphasis on “concrete rather than abstract-mathematical personality” (1989:7). See also Kon (1987), Protasenko (1988), and Butenko (1988).
References


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